|
Neil and Neil,
page 75
|
|
|
ABSTRACT
The Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to install a
Global-Positioning Device (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle registered to
respondent Jones’s wife. The warrant authorized installation in the District
of Columbia and within 10 days, but agents installed the device on the 11th
day and in Maryland. The Government then tracked the vehicle’s movements for
28 days. It subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on drug
trafficking and conspiracy charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS
data obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones’s residence, but held the
remaining data admissible because Jones had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when the vehicle was on public streets. Jones was convicted. The D.
C. Circuit reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence obtained by
warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.
|
The
Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to install a
Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle registered to
respondent Jones’s wife. The warrant authorized installation in the District
of Columbia and within 10 days, but agents installed the device on the 11th
day and in Maryland. The Government then tracked the vehicle’s movements for
28 days. It subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on drug
trafficking conspiracy charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS data
obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones’s residence, but held the
remaining data admissible because Jones had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when the vehicle was on public streets. Jones was convicted. The
D. C. Circuit reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence
obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth
Amendment.
|
|
Neil and Neil,
pages 75-76
|
|
|
INTRODUCTION
The
Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicles movements
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth
Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here
the government’s physical intrusion on an “effect” for the purpose of
obtaining information constitutes a “search.” This type of encroachment on an
area enumerated in the Amendment would have been considered a search within
the meaning of the Amendment at the time it was adopted.
This conclusion is consistent
with this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half
of the 20th century was tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which have
deviated from that exclusively property-based approach, have applied the
syllabus analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” id.,
at 360. Here, the Court need not address the government’s contention that
Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy,” because Jones’s Fourth
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must “assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo
v. United States, 533
U. S. 27, 34. Katz did not
repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular
concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 176; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64. United States v. Knotts,
460 U. S. 276, and United States v.
Karo, 468 U. S. 705—post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth
Amendment challenges to” beepers, “electronic tracking devices representing
another form of electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the conclusion that a
search occurred here. New York v.
Class, 475 U. S. 106, and Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, also do not support the
government’s position.
The
Government’s alternative argument and use of the device was a search, it was
a reasonable one—is forfeited because it was not raised below.
|
Held: The Government’s attachment of the GPS
device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment.
Pp. 3–12.
(a) The Fourth
Amendment
protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here, the
Government’s physical intrusion on an “effect” for the purpose of obtaining
information constitutes a “search.” This type of encroachment on an area
enumerated in the Amendment would have been considered a search within the
meaning of the Amendment at the time it was adopted. Pp. 3–4.
(b) This
conclusion is consistent with this Court’s Fourth
Amendment
jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th century was tied to
common-law trespass. Later cases, which have deviated from that exclusively
property-based approach, have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389
U. S. 347,
which said that the Fourth
Amendment
protects a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” id., at 360. Here,
the Court need not address the Government’s contention that Jones had no
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” because Jones’s Fourth
Amendment
rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court
must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth
Amendment
was adopted.” Kyllo v. United States, 533
U. S. 27.
Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth
Amendment
embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it
enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. See Alderman v.
United States, 394
U. S. 165;
Soldal v. Cook County, 506
U. S. 56.
United States v. Knotts, 460
U. S. 276,
and United States v. Karo, 468
U. S. 705—post-Katz
cases rejecting Fourth
Amendment
challenges to “beepers,” electronic tracking devices representing another
form of electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the conclusion that a search
occurred here. New York v. Class, 475
U. S. 106,
and Oliver v. United States, 466
U. S. 170,
also do not support the Government’s position. Pp. 4–12.
(c) The
Government’s alternative argument—that if the attachment and use of the
device was a search, it was a reasonable one—is forfeited because it was not
raised below. P. 12.
|
|
Neil and Neil,
page 76
|
|
|
PREMISE
In 2004
respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in the District
of Columbia, came under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics and was made
the target of an investigation by a joint FBI and Metropolitan Police
Department task force. Officers employed various investigative techniques,
including visual surveillance of the nightclub, installation of a camera
focused on the front door of the club, and a pen register and wiretap
covering Jones’s cellular phone. Based in part on information gathered from
these sources, in 2005 the Government applied to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for a warrant authorizing the use of an
electronic tracking device on the Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to Jones’s
wife. A warrant issued authorizing installation of the device in the District
of Columbia and within 10 days.
On the 11th
day, and not in the District of Columbia but in Maryland, agents installed a
GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a
public parking lot. Over the next 28 days, the Government used the device to
track the vehicle’s movements, and once had to replace the device’s battery
when the vehicle was parked in a different public lot in Maryland. By means
of signals from multiple satellites, the device established the vehicle’s
location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that location by cellular
phone to a government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over
the 4-week period.
The Government
ultimately obtained a multiple-count indictment charging Jones and several
alleged co-conspirators with, as relevant here, conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50
grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846.
Before trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the
GPS device. The District Court granted the motion only in part, suppressing
the data obtained while the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining
Jones’s residence. 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (2006). It held the remaining data
admissible because a person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another.’ ” Ibid. (quoting
United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 281 (1983)).
Jones’s trial in October 2006 produced a hung jury on the conspiracy count.
In March 2007,
a grand jury returned another indictment, charging Jones and others with the
same conspiracy. The Government introduced at trial the same GPS-derived
locational data admitted in the first trial, which connected Jones to the
alleged conspirators’ stash house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97
kilograms of cocaine, and 1 kilogram of cocaine base. The jury returned a
guilty verdict, and the District Court sentenced Jones to life imprisonment.
The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
conviction because of admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use
of the GPS device which, it said, violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Maynard, 615 F. 3d 544 (2010).The
D. C. Circuit denied the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc, with
four judges dissenting. 625 F. 3d 766 (2010). We granted certiorari, 564 U.
S. (2011).
|
In 2004 respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator
of a nightclub in the District of Columbia, came under suspicion of
trafficking in narcotics and was made the target of an investigation by a
joint FBI and Metropolitan Police Department task force. Officers employed
various investigative techniques, including visual surveillance of the
nightclub, installation of a camera focused on the front door of the club,
and a pen register and wiretap covering Jones’s cellular phone.
Based in part on information gathered from these
sources, in 2005 the Government applied to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a warrant authorizing the use of an
electronic tracking device on the Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to Jones’s wife.
A warrant issued, authorizing installation of the de- vice in the District of
Columbia and within 10 days.On the 11th day, and not in the District of
Columbia but in Maryland, 1 agents
installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep while it was
parked in a public parking lot. Over the next 28 days, the Government used
the device to track the vehicle’s movements, and once had to replace the
device’s battery when the vehicle was parked in a different public lot in
Maryland. By means of signals from multiple satellites, the device
established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated
that location by cellular phone to a Government computer. It relayed more
than 2,000 pages of data over the 4-week period.
The Government ultimately obtained a multiple-count
indictment charging Jones and several alleged co-conspirators with, as
relevant here, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846. Before trial, Jones filed a
motion to suppress evidence obtained through the GPS device. The District
Court granted the motion only in part, suppressing the data obtained while
the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. 451
F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (2006). It held the remaining data admissible,
because “ ‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460
U. S. 276,
281 (1983) ). Jones’s trial in October
2006 produced a hung jury on the conspiracy count.
In March 2007, a grand jury returned another
indictment, charging Jones and others with the same conspir- acy. The
Government introduced at trial the same GPS-derived locational data admitted
in the first trial, which connected Jones to the alleged conspirators’ stash
house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97 kilograms of cocaine, and 1
kilogram of cocaine base. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the
District Court sentenced Jones to life imprisonment.
The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
conviction because of admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use
of the GPS device which, it said, violated the Fourth Amend- ment. United
States v. Maynard, 615 F. 3d 544 (2010). The D. C. Circuit denied
the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc, with four judges dissenting.
625 F. 3d 766 (2010). We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. ___ (2011).
|
|
Neil and Neil,
page 77
|
Villasenor
(2012)
|
|
To be
engaged in the world means leaving detailed digital records of almost
everything we do. Mobile phone service providers log the list of cell sites
to which our cell phones connect throughout the day. Mobile apps gather data
on the usage patterns of our wireless devices. They also track device
location to the accuracy of a specific residence or office building. All of
which undermines the oft cited claim that the data gathered is not
“personal”. License plate cameras record our automobile trips. Even when we
walk into a store, restaurant, office building, or sit in a taxi, images of
us are recorded and date stamped.
|
Mobile phone service providers
log the list of cell sites to which our cell phones connect throughout the
day. Mobile apps, more than half
a billion of which were downloaded in the U.S.
during the last week of December alone, gather data on the usage patterns of
our wireless devices. In addition, mobile apps often track device location to
the accuracy of a specific residence or office building, undermining the
oft-cited claim that the data gathered is not "personal." Much of
this data is collected and then sold with our consent, in accordance with privacy policies that few of us
read before accepting, to a complex ecosystem of mobile application providers
and advertisers. License plate cameras record our automobile trips. When we
walk into a store, restaurant, office building, or sit in a taxi, images of
us are recorded and date-stamped.
|
|
Neil and Neil,
page 77
|
Villasenor
(2012)
|
|
The
question before the Court turned in significant part on the “physical
trespass” involved in placing the GPS tracker on the suspect’s car.
|
The question before the Court
turned in significant part on the physical trespass involved in placing a GPS
tracker on a suspect's car.
|
Sunday, May 12, 2013
Clute Institute 2013 Publication: United States V. Jones
Benjamin
A. Neil and Benjamin A. Neil II (2013) "United States V. Jones 132 S. Ct 945" (2012). Journal of Business Case
Studies, Jan/Feb: http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JBCS/article/view/7547
Clute Institute 2011 Publication: Are Private Military Firms The Answer To The Expanding Global Crisis?
Neil, Benjamin A., and Neil,
Benjamin A., II. (2011) “Are Private Military Firms The Answer To The Expanding
Global Crisis?” International Business & Economics Research Journal 10(2): 13-20.
|
Neil and Neil, page 13
|
PW Singer, “Outsourcing War”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005. [Note that Neil and Neil do correctly
cite the source of the ideas they are presenting, but give the impression
that words used are their own, even when they are not]
|
|
The modern private military industry emerged at the start
of the 1990’s, driven by three dynamics: 1) the end of the Cold War, 2)
transformations in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between
soldiers and civilians, and 3) a general trend toward privatization and the
outsourcing of government functions round the world. At the same time,
increasing global instability created a demand for more troops. Meanwhile,
advanced militaries grew increasingly reliant on off-the-shelf commercial
technology, often maintained and operated by private firms (Singer, P.W.,
March 1, 2005, “Outsourcing War - private military firms - Foreign Affairs).
|
The
modern private military industry emerged at the start of the 1990s, driven by
three dynamics: the end of the Cold War, transformations in the nature of
warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a general
trend toward privatization and outsourcing of government functions around the
world. … At the same time, increasing global instability created a demand for
more troops. … Meanwhile, advanced militaries grew increasingly reliant on
off-the-shelf commercial technology, often maintained and operated by private
firms.
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 13
|
Nathaniel Stinnett (2005) “REGULATING
THE PRIVATIZATION OF WAR: HOW TO STOP PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS FROM COMMITTING
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES” Boston College International &
Comparative Law Review, 28(1): 211-224. [Note that Neil and Neil do not cite
the Stinnett source, nor do they use quote marks even when they are using
Stinnett words. They do however, refer
to the exact same original sources as Stinnett]
|
|
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an abundance
of unemployed, highly-trained soldiers in the Developed World (Juan Carlos
Zarate, 1998, “The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International
Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Order”, 34 Stan. J. Int’l L., 75).
Recently, the market has seen an increasing demand for
such soldiers to support developing world regimes that had hitherto relied
upon their Cold War sponsors for military support (Id.). A similar demand
also exists among developing world armies who now look for many of their
training and support needs (P.W. Singer, 2002, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise
of Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International
Security,” 26 Int’l
Sec 186,
188-189). Private Military Firms (PMF‟s), which are “profit driven
organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to
warfare”, have stepped in to fill these demands in the global security market
(Id. @ 186).
|
Since
the end of the Cold War, there has been an abundance of unemployed,
highly-trained soldiers in the Developed World.[1] Recently, the market has seen an increasing demand for
such soldiers to support Developing World regimes that had hitherto relied
upon their Cold War sponsors for military support.[2] A similar demand also exists among Developed World
armies, who now look to outsource many of their training and support needs.[3] Private Military Firms (PMFs), which are “profit driven
organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare,”
have stepped in to fill these demands in the global security market.[4]
Numbers
represent footnotes in the original text and refer to the following sources:
1 See Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New
Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and
the New World Disorder, 34 Stan. J. Int’l L. 75, 75–76 (1998).
2 Id.
3 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the
Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International
Security, 26 Int’l Sec. 186, 188–89 (2001/02).
4 See id. at 186.
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 14
|
Franklin Mwirigi
Murianki, “The
Rise of Private Military Companies and the Legal Vacuum of Regulation” Last
updated 06/01/2010.
|
|
Private military
companies are considered to be present day “mercenaries‟ and this presents
challenges in defining a mercenary under humanitarian law because of the
nature of work of these corporations. Are their employees recognized as
civilians, yet performing purely military functions?
|
Private military companies are
considered to be present day ‘mercenaries’ and this presents challenges in
defining a mercenary under humanitarian law because of the nature of work of
these corporations. Are their employees recognized as civilians, yet
performing purely military functions?
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 14
|
The Rise of Private Military Companies and the Legal Vacuum of
Regulation by Franklin Mwirigi Murianki Last Updated: 06/01/2010:
|
|
The provision of
these companies is that of security as a product; the speed, efficiency and
cost benefit to governments as compared to maintaining a standing army for
times of both war and peace.
|
The provision of
these companies is that of security as a product; the speed, efficiency and
cost benefit to governments as compared to maintaining a standing army for
times of both war and peace.
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 14
|
Nathaniel
Stinnett (2005) “REGULATING
THE PRIVATIZATION OF WAR: HOW TO STOP PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS FROM COMMITTING
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES” Boston College International &
Comparative Law Review, 28(1): 211-224.
|
|
Despite their widespread use, PMF‟s fall within a gap in
international law, which presumes and prefers a monopolization of force by
state actors. Indeed, although PMF‟s often perform the same tasks as
state-sponsored militaries, the PMF corporate structure is a foreign concept
to international law. Therefore, there is very little legal protection for
the victims of PMF human rights abuses (Tina Garmon, 2003, “Domesticating
International Corporate Responsibility: Holding Private Military Firms
Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act”, 11 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 325, 338-39).
|
Despite their widespread use, PMFs fall within a gap in
international law, which presumes and prefers a monopolization of force by
state actors.[6] Indeed, although PMFs often perform the same tasks as
state-sponsored militaries, the PMF corporate structure is a foreign concept
to international law.[7] Therefore, there is very little legal protection for the
victims of PMF human rights abuses.[8]
Note, sources are as follows:
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 14
|
[Strangely, Neil and Neil refer to what
is Sanchez’s source [23], ie., McIvor, Paul. "Private peacekeeping-
opportunity or impossibility?" Peacekeeping & International
Relations, Nov/Dec 1998].
|
|
In addition, a PMC can offer advantages over a government
assembled force. They can deploy forces rapidly, avoid the difficulties of
ad-hoc multi-national firms (command is streamlined and cohesive); they
usually have standing logistics for transport, appear to be cost-effective,
and are willing to sustain loss of life (McIvor, Paul, Nov/Dec, 1998,“Private
peacekeeping – opportunity or impossibility?” Peacekeeping & International Relations).
|
… a PNC can offer advantages over a UN assembled force. A private
company can deploy forces rapidly, avoid the difficulties of ad-hoc
multinational forces (command is streamlined and cohesive), they usually have
standing logistics for transport, appear to be cost-effective, and are
willing to sustain loss of life.[22] Some believe that if the option fulfills
the goals of the UN and moral objections are set aside for expedient and
effective measures, contracting private military companies can provide an
opportunity to remake peacekeeping strategy.
Reference [22] is to Shearer, David. "Private Armies and Military
Intervention," Adelphi Paper 316. February 1998. [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/iiss/prap316.htm]
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 15
|
|
|
Mercenaries, soldiers of fortunes and private armies have
existed since the time of ancient Greeks, Chinese and Romans. Individuals,
states or societies, which were unable to secure territory, property or
engage in war, resorted to the practice of employing armies and soldiers.
|
Mercenaries, soldiers of fortune and private armies have existed since
the time of the ancient Greeks, Chinese and Romans. Individuals, states or
societies, which were unable to secure territory, property or engage in war,
resorted to the practice of employing armies and soldiers.
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 15
|
Nathaniel
Stinnett (2005) “REGULATING
THE PRIVATIZATION OF WAR: HOW TO STOP PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS FROM COMMITTING
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES” Boston College International &
Comparative Law Review, 28(1): 211-224.
|
|
As long as humanity has waged war, there have been
mercenaries (Zarate @ 82). Indeed, the history of private militaries can be
traced back at least 3,000 years, when Numidian mercenaries played a large
role in Ramses II‟s attack on Kadesh in 1294 B.C.; the biblical King David‟s
mercenaries drove the Philistines from Israel in 1,000 B.C. (Todd S.
Milliard, 2003, “Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to recognize and
Regulate Private Military Companies”, 176 Mil.L.Rev.1). The
ancient Greeks and Romans also relied heavily on mercenaries, as did Emperor
Justinian and William the Conqueror (Milliard @ 2).
|
“As long as humanity has waged war, there have been
mercenaries.”[10] Indeed, the history of private militaries can be traced
back at least 3,000 years, when Numidian mercenaries played a large role in
Ramses II’s attack on Kadesh (1294 B.C.), and biblical King David’s
mercenaries drove the Philistines from Israel (1000 B.C.).[11] The ancient Greeks and Romans also relied heavily upon
mercenaries, as did Emperor Justinian and William the Conqueror.[12]
Note, sources are as follows:
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 15
|
Nathaniel
Stinnett (2005) “REGULATING
THE PRIVATIZATION OF WAR: HOW TO STOP PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS FROM COMMITTING
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES” Boston College International &
Comparative Law Review, 28(1): 211-224.
|
|
The use of mercenaries continued unabated up through the
modern era. In the Middle Ages, companies of fighting men offered their
collective skills to whoever would hire them (Zarate @ 83). During the
Renaissance, Italy’s city-states contracted with freelance military
commanders, or condottieri, so as to deny military power to potential
domestic rivals and to avoid disrupting “the productive economy by forcing
normal citizens into military service” (Zarate @ 84). Most of the forces used
in the Thirty Years‟ War (1618-1648) were privately contracted (Singer @ 190)
and the British Crown famously hired Hessian soldiers to fight against George
Washington‟s troops in the American Revolutionary War (Zarate @ 85). Indeed,
“not until the Franco-German War of 1870 did the „nations-in-arms‟ concept
gain predominance in the world‟s militaries”, after which armies built upon
national loyalties that quickly became the international norm (Milliard @
6-7).
|
The use of mercenaries continued unabated up through the
modern era. In the Middle Ages, companies of fighting men offered their
collective skills to whomever would hire them.[13] During the Renaissance, Italy’s city-states contracted
with freelance military commanders, or condottieri, so as to deny
military power to potential domestic rivals and to avoid disrupting “the
productive economy by forcing normal citizens into military service.”[14] Most of the forces used in the Thirty Years’ War
(1618–1648) were privately contracted,[15] and the British Crown famously hired Hessian soldiers to
fight against George Washington’s troops in the American Revolutionary War.[16] Indeed, “not until the Franco-German War of 1870 did the
‘nation-in-arms’ concept gain predominance in the world’s militaries,” after
which armies built upon national loyalties quickly became the international
norm.[17]
Note source are as follows:
|
|
Neil and Neil, page 15
|
|
|
After the Cold War, a shift occurred where weak and
emerging states could not guarantee their own security to provide for and
rise armies in the face of increasing internal violence and civil wars. Due
to the absence of international action, these weak states have resorted to
contracting private armies and mercenaries from abroad to maintain stability
at home (“Ukrainian mercenaries serve in many conflict areas”, Spring, 1998, Special Warfare).
|
After the Cold War a shift occurred where weak and emerging states
could not guarantee their own security or provide for and raise armies in the
face of increasing internal violence and civil wars. These countries have
looked to other states and international organizations for assistance and
intervention. Due to the absence of international action, theses weak states
have resorted to contracting private armies and mercenaries from abroad to
maintain stability at home. [1]
Note, that source [1] is "Ukrainian mercenaries serve in many
conflict areas," Special Warfare, Spring 1998.
|
|
Page 17:
|
|
|
In February 2007, Senator Obama
introduced the Transparency and Accountability in Military Security
Contracting Act as an amendment to the 2008 Defense Authorization Act,
requiring federal agencies to report to Congress on the numbers of security
contractors employed, killed, wounded, and disciplinary actions taken against
them. Referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, it never passed. Then
in February 2009, as president, Obama introduced reforms to reduce PMC
spending and shift outsourced work back to the government. He also promised
to improve the quality of acquisition workers – government employees involved
in supervising and auditing billions of dollars spent monthly on contracts.
Even so, PMCs are fully integrated into national security and other
government functions.
|
In February 2007, Senator Obama
introduced the Transparency and Accountability in Military Security
Contracting Act as an amendment to the 2008 Defense Authorization Act,
requiring federal agencies to report to Congress on the numbers of security
contractors employed, killed, wounded, and disciplinary actions taken against
them. Referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, it never passed. Then
in February 2009, as president, Obama introduced reforms to reduce PMC
spending and shift outsourced work back to the government. He also promised
to improve the quality of acquisition workers – government employees involved
in supervising and auditing billions of dollars spent monthly on contracts.
Even so, PMCs are fully integrated into national security and other
government functions, as evidenced
by the massive numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan alone.
|
|
Page 19:
|
The Military-Industrial Complex (July 28, 2008):
|
|
United States presidents,
particularly Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, put private
corporate interests over government responsibility to its citizens. By
transferring military and intelligence functions to private companies, these
administrations hollowed out government oversight. For example, although
Congress rejected funding for the Total Information Awareness Program, which
would have granted the U.S. government the ability to create personal date
files on its citizens, the National Security Agency hired private contractors
to compile the information instead.
|
Author Chalmers Johnson argues that US presidents, particularly Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George
W. Bush, put private corporate interests over government responsibility to
its citizens. By transferring military and intelligence functions to private
companies, these administrations hollowed out government oversight. For
example, although Congress rejected funding for the Total Information
Awareness Program, which would have granted the US government the ability to
create personal data files on its citizens, the National Security Agency
hired private contractors to compile the information instead. (CommonDreams)
|
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)